The University of Maine

DigitalCommons@UMaine
Anthropology Faculty Scholarship

Anthropology

2014

Adding Environment to the Collective Action
Problem: Individuals, Civil Society, and the
Mangrove-Fishery Commons in Ecuador
Christine M. Beitl
University of Maine - Main, christine.beitl@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/ant_facpub
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Latin American Studies Commons,
Nature and Society Relations Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons
Repository Citation
Beitl, Christine M., "Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem: Individuals, Civil Society, and the Mangrove-Fishery
Commons in Ecuador" (2014). Anthropology Faculty Scholarship. 7.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/ant_facpub/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact
um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.

THIS IS A PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION OF:
Beitl, C. M. (2014). "Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem: Individuals,
Civil Society, and the Mangrove-Fishery Commons in Ecuador." World Development
56(0): 93-107.
THE FINAL VERSION CAN BE FOUND AT THE FOLLOWING URL:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X13002386

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem: Individuals, Civil
Society, and the Mangrove-Fishery Commons in Ecuador
Christine M. Beitl
Department of Anthropology
University of Maine
christine.beitl@maine.edu

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

1. INTRODUCTION
Research in sustainability science has emphasized that collective action plays a
critical role in resource governance, resilience and adaptation to various forms of
environmental change (Adger, 2003; Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstrom,
2005; Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Endter-Wada & Keenan, 2005; Kurien, 1995; Nelson,
Adger, & Brown, 2007). Broadly defined as cooperation among individuals, collective
action is often based on communication, trust, reciprocity, and a shared vision
(Mosimane, Breen, & Nkhata, 2012; Ostrom, 1998; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Smith,
2010). Successful coordination among individuals may prevent the scenario Garrett
Hardin (1968) famously described as the tragedy of the commons, in which shared
resources are overharvested by rational actors maximizing their personal gains. Four
decades of research on the commons have largely debunked Hardin’s assumptions by
highlighting the ability of individuals and communities to self-organize for the
governance of natural resources (Acheson, 2011a; Agrawal, 2001; Araral, 2009; Ostrom,
1990; Dolsak & Ostrom, 2003; Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, & May, 2013; Ruttan, 2006;
McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom et al., 2002).
Common property theory has largely emphasized the role of institutions in
mediating individual resource use (Berkes, 1996; Ostrom, 1990) and experimental
research has advanced understanding about other conditions under which such forms of
collective action are possible (Henrich et al., 2005; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom & Walker,
2003). However a general theory about individual decision-making within the context of
common pool resource dilemmas remains poorly developed (Janssen, 2010). Despite the
wealth of experimental research on collective action and case studies of common
property institutions, surprisingly little attention has been given to the ways in which
resource characteristics and ecological dynamics influence individual behavior (Janssen
2010) or the creation of institutions (Agrawal, 2001; 2002). A more robust understanding
of human-resource interactions is needed to strengthen theoretical propositions about
collective action, group formation, and the sustainable governance of the commons.
The research presented here explores the influence of local civil society
institutions on human-resource interactions in the commons at two levels in coastal
Ecuador: 1) the fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara tuberculosa and A. similis),
bivalve mollusks harvested from the roots of mangrove trees at low tide by artisanal
fishers; and 2) its broader mangrove wetland habitat. For decades, the conversion of
mangrove forests for shrimp farming in Ecuador has exacerbated harvesting pressures on
many small-scale fisheries. Since the 1990s, a thriving civil society sector has grown out
of grassroots resistance to shrimp aquaculture. At the same time, Ecuador has taken great
strides in the direction toward participatory sustainable coastal management (Beitl, 2011;
Guest, 1999; Olsen, Ochoa, & Robadue, 2003; Robadue, 1995). Mangrove deforestation
rates have begun to subside since the year 2000 and some areas are showing signs of
recovery (CLIRSEN-PMRC, 2007). Presently, many local fishing associations continue
to engage in activism concerning the defense of mangroves and some also work
collaboratively with government agencies to address resource management and
development issues in artisanal fisheries.
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Despite the innovative policy interventions and the recovery of mangroves in
some areas, the fishery for mangrove cockles continues to experience harvesting
pressures (Mora & Moreno, 2009; Mora, Moreno, & Jurado, 2009; 2011). In 2001, the
Subsecretaría de Recursos Pesqueros (SRP), a government regulatory agency, prohibited
the harvest of shells smaller than 45mm in length. These regulations are in line with
customary norms by which fishers have traditionally left behind smaller shells in the
mangroves to allow biological processes of larval dispersal, settlement, and growth.
Members of fishing associations (hereafter referred to as socios) adamantly insist they are
more “responsible” fishers than non-affiliated cockle collectors because they obey shell
size regulations and participate in workshops that increase awareness. Some government
officials believe that mandating all cockle collectors to join associations would address
problems of overexploitation. But many cockle collectors are wary of institutions and
prefer not to participate (Beitl, 2012). Verifying popular claims about who engages in
“responsible fishing” would not only settle the debate and inform fishery policies in
Ecuador, but also contribute more broadly to theoretical understanding about the complex
relationship between collective action and the environment.
This multi-sited comparative case study of two resource systems draws on
ethnographic and fishery data to explore the general question: how do resource
characteristics and the institutional context affect people’s behavior toward common pool
resources? Specifically, I ethnographically explore the emergence of local associations of
cockle fishers and other “ancestral users” of mangrove resources within the context of
widespread environmental degradation associated with shrimp farming. I further examine
how those local institutions influence human-resource interactions by statistically testing
whether membership explains differences in 1) fishing behavior (measured by the
average length of shells in each fisher’s catch); and 2) participation in activities that
promote mangrove conservation (i.e. reforestation, activism). These two measures of
human-resource interactions represent two different kinds of collective action problems,
which may partially explain why local institutions successfully encourage participation in
management regimes that uphold the mangrove commons but seem to have little effect
on cooperation in the fishery commons. Understanding such mixed effects of collective
action behaviors in different resource systems further contributes to knowledge about the
interaction between other outcomes like ecological sustainability, livelihoods, and equity,
which is of increasing interest in the literature on common pool resource governance
(Agrawal & Benson, 2011; Persha, Fischer, Chhatre, Agrawal, & Benson, 2010).
2. COLLECTIVE ACTION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT
Global trends of population growth, urbanization, and rising market demand or
seafood products have been transforming coastal zones and artisanal fisheries throughout
the developing world for decades. Coastal mangrove forests have been among the most
vulnerable forest types to such forms of global change for their widespread
undervaluation that has often led to their conversion to other uses like shrimp farming
(Alongi, 2002; Cormier-Salem, 2006; FAO, 2007; Martinez-Alier, 2001; Valiela, Bowen,
& York, 2001). The social and ecological impacts of shrimp aquaculture such as
landscape transformations, community displacement, livelihood loss, the erosion of
resource rights, and conflict, have been well-documented in the literature (Cruz-Torres,
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2000; Deb, 1998; Dewalt, Vergne, & Hardin, 1996; Gunawardena & Rowan, 2005;
Martinez-Alier, 2001; Meltzoff & LiPuma, 1986; Primavera, 1997; Stonich, 1995;
Stonich & Vandergeest, 2001; Veuthey & Gerber, 2011). Such chronic environmental
degradation increases vulnerability in coastal areas and threatens resilience (Adger et al.,
2005), or the ability of a social-ecological system to learn, adapt, reorganize, and
maintain its identity in the face of change (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2003). However, in
some places around the world including Ecuador, coastal communities have empowered
themselves, engaged in collective action, and formed coalitions of resistance to defend
livelihoods and the environment where property rights have been poorly defined
(Martinez-Alier, 2001; Stonich & Bailey, 2000; Veuthey & Gerber, 2011).
(a) Civil society as collective action institutions
Civil society plays a pivotal role in environmental issues of the new millennium
(Little, 1999). It is often well-positioned to negotiate and advocate rights-based
approaches to resource management and sustainable development, especially in places
where commercial interests are privileged over local wellbeing (Johnson & Forsyth,
2002) or where government agencies are unable to adequately meet local needs. On the
Ecuadorian coast, many civil society organizations were born out of a struggle between
artisanal fishers and shrimp farmers over access to resources. In the early 1990s,
extensive mangrove deforestation in Ecuador provoked outrage among activists and
communities who began to mobilize in response. Muisne, one of the study areas for this
research in the northern province of Esmeraldas, has been an important center for
collective action and grassroots resistance to the shrimp industry when a group of youths
formed a local non-government organization (NGO) in the early 1990s (Veuthey &
Gerber, 2011). This NGO has played an instrumental role in helping communities
organize into associations of ancestral users. Now internationally connected, the NGO
continues to work with associations throughout the Muisne-Cojimíes Estuary to lead
community development projects, network with other “ancestral user” associations in
other provinces, and create national and international awareness campaigns for mangrove
conservation, social justice, and the defense of livelihoods.
Similarly, in the southern province of El Oro, several communities throughout the
Archipiélago Jambelí also began organizing in the early 1990s to gain government
recognition of their “right to work” as artisanal fishers in the face of the rapidly
expanding shrimp industry. Particularly in the south, one important benefit of creating
associations and cooperatives has been increased access to government and nongovernment agencies for technical and financial assistance, such as loans and subsidies
for economic development in rural coastal communities. Several local associations are
now members of an umbrella federation of artisanal fishing organizations of the south,
which is nested within a larger, national federation that works closely with government
agencies to organize meetings and events that facilitate participatory practices in fisheries
and coastal management. Such cross-scale institutional linkages are often considered an
appropriate approach to managing complex social-ecological systems like fisheries
(Berkes, 2002).
In the last decade, local institutions have gained more government and
international support, which has fostered local empowerment and allowed for new forms
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of social-ecological change on the Ecuadorian coast. The new Presidential Decree 1391
calling for a regulation of the shrimp industry will most likely create more opportunities
for cross-scale collective actions and collaboration between multiple sectors for the
recuperation of lost mangrove habitat.i Under the new institutional arrangements that
emerged from this policy, shrimp farmers have already begun to sponsor reforestation
projects carried out by local associations and other civil society organizations, in which
mangrove planters are often financially compensated for their participation. It is expected
that such efforts will restore many of Ecuador’s degraded coastal wetlands that were
converted for shrimp farming during the 1980s and 1990s.
(b) Common property and local resource rights
Decentralization and devolution of ecosystem management to local communities
for the promotion of environmental stewardship and social equity has been a central
theme within the common property literature (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Antinori &
Bray, 2005). One defining characteristic of Ecuador’s innovative coastal management
policies has been the recognition of the “ancestral” rights of artisanal fishers in 1999,
paving the way for 10-year mangrove concessions granted by the government to local
associations throughout the coast. These new common property rights called custodias
have two general aims: 1) to conserve and restore degraded mangrove areas; 2) to
promote sustainable resource use and community management. Currently, 37,818
hectares of mangroves are held in 41 concessions for community-based conservation
(Rosero Moya & Santillan Salas, 2011).
The local management of a custodia requires collective action on the part of
individuals bound by a community or institutional affiliation. To qualify, a community or
group of “ancestral users” must first organize into an association or cooperative officially
recognized by the state. As an organization, they must then submit an application
package consisting of maps, the names of officers, a list of members, a copy of the
association’s agreement, and a management plan detailing the sustainable use of
resources (Bravo, 2007). Similar to the system of co-management in Chile (Gelcich,
Guzman, Rodriguez-Sickert, Castilla, and Cárdenas, 2013), the management plan of an
Ecuadorian custodia is designed by the local fishing association in collaboration with an
external NGO or university that provides technical assistance for a minimum of two
years. In everyday use, these institutional arrangements function much like the common
property regimes described by Ostrom (1990), in which members of the association work
cooperatively to maintain a system of monitoring, sanctioning, and exclusion of outsiders
over a particular resource domain collectively agreed upon by the association. Because of
the benefits often cited, such as mangrove protection, sustainable resource management,
local empowerment, and economic gains (Beitl, 2011; Bravo, 2007; Coello, Vinueza
Burgos, & Alemán, 2008), several associations in El Oro Province have submitted
applications for a custodia of their own. As an outcome of the multi-tiered institutional
interactions between civil society and the Ecuadorian government, the custodias in
Ecuador represent what some have called the “new commons,” in which newly
recognized resource rights have great potential to transform human-environment
relationships (Ruiz-Ballesteros & Gual, 2012).
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Some researchers argue that diverse outcomes of governance strategies are rarely
analyzed together in the literature, and therefore there is no reason to assume that
collective action institutions ensure sustainability, equity, and livelihood security to equal
degrees (Agrawal & Benson, 2011). In a previous study of the cockle fishery, I found that
one custodia in the province of El Oro was associated with larger catch and shell sizes,
indicating ecological and economic benefits, but only for those members of the
association who controlled access (Beitl, 2011). Nonmembers without access felt
increasingly marginalized as mangroves were enclosed by shrimp farming on one hand
and common property arrangements on the other (Beitl, 2012).
My previous study of the cockle fishery employed an institutional-level of
analysis using the measure of success that Ruttan (2008) refers to as collective goods
provisioning. This level of analysis does not capture whether individuals comply with the
rules-in-use or if some other environmental factors are at play to promote larger shell and
catch sizes. As Ruttan pointed out, it is important to be explicit as to how “success” is
measured and distinguish between the collective action problem and the provisioning of
goods, which are not necessarily related (Ruttan, 1998; 2008). In this paper, I turn to the
collective action problem, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis, a more
appropriate measure for capturing individual differentiation that helps explain the success
or failure of collective action (Ruttan 2008).
(c) Two kinds of collective action: contribution vs. subtractability
The scholarly literature on collective action fundamentally points to two different
kinds of collective action problems faced by individuals coordinating their efforts for
collective benefit. The first kind of collective action problem refers to an individual’s
contribution of time, money, or resources (Beard, 2007; Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965; Tilly
& Tilly, 1981). Much of this research examines factors that facilitate or inhibit the ability
of individuals to contribute to collective action, such as wealth heterogeneity, ethnic
heterogeneity, social capital, and community size (Araral, 2009; Beard, 2007; Jones,
2004; Ruttan, 2006, 2008; Waring, 2011). Jones (2004) examines the effects of wealth
heterogeneity on trust as a mediating factor affecting collective action, arguing that trust
allows for more successful functioning among agricultural cooperatives in Ecuador.
Beard (2007) also examines wealth in a multivariate regression of factors affecting
contributions to collective action in Indonesia. She also found that social networks were a
strong predictor of the ability of households to contribute to community development
with implications for how benefits are distributed. In addition to multiple variables and
societal constraints on collective action, institutions are often recognized for their
mediating role (Araral, 2009; Folke & Berkes, 1995; Waring, 2011).
The second kind of collective action problem is described in the commons
literature as a subtractability problem, a situation in which extraction by one resource
user is costly for the group and the exclusion of users is difficult (Acheson, 2011a;
Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & Policansky, 1999; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker,
1994). Rational choice theories about collective action in the commons stipulate that
individuals have little incentive to cooperate or invest in resources when they are not
rightful owners or when the costs of cooperating outweigh the benefits (Acheson &
Gardner 2010; Ostrom, et al. 1994). Thus, a collective action dilemma refers to the ways
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in which rational behavior by individuals results in a tragedy for the larger collectivity
(Acheson & Gardner, 2010) or Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons. However, as
noted by Folke and Berkes (1995: 123), individual decisions about resource use are
usually mediated by social controls or sanctions. It has long been suggested that social
interaction is embedded within the larger cultural ecological context (McCay, 2002;
McCay & Acheson, 1987).
(d) Conditions for collective action
Much research on collective action has sought to understand the conditions under
which decisions to cooperate are most likely. Institutions can serve as formal constraints
(rules, laws, constitutions) or informal constraints (norms of behavior or conventions),
which influence social interaction (Berkes, Folke, & Colding, 1998). For example,
institutions often help define social interactions when actors do not share common goals
or when power differentials are embedded within community relations (Agrawal &
Gibson, 1999). Recent research has drawn attention to social networks (Beard, 2007;
Crona & Bodin, 2006) and social learning (Biedenweg & Monroe, 2013) as structural
conditions that influence social interaction.
Corroborating numerous empirical studies on the crucial role of institutions, much
experimental research has also shown that trust, reciprocity, reputation (Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981; Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom, 1998; Ostrom & Walker, 2003) and the ability
to punish defectors (Boyd & Richerson, 1992) are among the multiple factors that
influence people’s willingness and ability to cooperate. Other researchers have argued
that pro-social behaviors are rooted in our evolutionary past. From this perspective,
human behavior is mediated through communication (Smith, 2010) or by an evolved
psychological system based on repeated experiences that affect human emotion, guilt,
friendship, dislike, moralistic aggression, gratitude, sympathy, trust, suspicion, and
trustworthiness (Kurzban, 2003; Trivers, 1971). Such socio-cultural contexts constitute
what many researchers refer to as “informal institutions” (Berkes et al., 1998).
(e) Linking social and ecological systems
In addition to the socio-cultural context, some research on the commons has
shown that certain characteristics of common pool resources make some more
manageable than others, such as small size or definitive boundaries that facilitate the
ability of groups to make collective choice agreements (Agrawal, 2001; McCay &
Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990). In some cases, a successful self-governing system may
emerge from the ways in which resource users respond to environmental conditions
(Basurto, 2005; 2008). Thus, the sustainability of any governance system is contingent
upon the biophysical state of the resource system (Basurto, 2008).
Other research has shown that when resources are scarce, cooperative
relationships may break down (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998; Laughlin, 1974). For
example, Wutich (2009) has shown that water scarcity in an urban setting in Bolivia
places external pressure on cooperative relationships within the community even when
operational rules and collective choice agreements are well-established. Araral (2009) has
found that in addition to multiple factors, water scarcity has a curvilinear effect on
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collective action in irrigation systems in the Philippines. However, in their systematic
review of case studies, Agrawal and Benson (2011: 205) note that surprisingly less
attention has been given to biophysical factors of resources in the fisheries literature.
In contrast to the multiple factors that break down collective action, other
researchers have drawn attention to the importance of perceptions and common
understandings, or what Russell Hardin (1982) may have classified as moral motivations
for collective action. Some researchers argue that people must have a general sense of
risk perception and awareness of the collective cost to avoid a tragedy (Burke, 2001),
which also holds true for maintaining the strength of local institutions (Becker, 2003).
Experience with resource decline also plays a role. For example, a conservation ethic
emerged among lobstermen in Maine after a historical stock failure, allowing for the
coevolution of new attitudes and cooperative behavior (Acheson & Gardner, 2010). Other
researchers argue that cohesion under a collective identity is a necessary condition for
collective action (Mosimane et al., 2012).
On the other hand, motivations for collective action may not always be clear and
not all forms of cooperation are in the interest of conservation. In her study of the
management of mother-of-pearl shells in Indonesia, Ruttan (1998) found that villagers
successfully cooperate and prevent free riding to defend access to fishing areas and
ensure their own economic returns, but conservation is an epi-phenomenal outcome and
not the result of intentional conservation. Such assertions challenge the assumptions
about stewardship inherent in much of the common property literature. But as many
researchers have pointed out, relatively few case studies have collected both biological
and social data at the same time (Berkes, 2005; Pollnac & Johnson, 2005). More recently,
researchers have made increasing efforts to link social institutions with environmental
outcomes (Acheson, 1987; Bray, Ellis, Armijo-Canto, & Beck, 2004; Rustagi et al.,
2010; Persha, Agrawal, & Chhatre, 2011; Persha et al., 2010). These studies of the forest
commons have been able to quantitatively explore the relationship between identifiable
user groups with enforceable property rights and forest outcomes. But theoretical
understanding about human-resource interactions at the individual level remains poorly
understood (Janssen, 2010).
Simulating dynamic ecological conditions of differential resource renewal rates
under controlled laboratory conditions, Janssen (2010) has found that individuals subtract
from a common pool in ways that respond to these ecological dynamics. In addition to
communication, he proposes that group identity formation and an individual’s
commitment to cooperate also play a crucial role in the process of group formation and
the development of strategies to avoid overharvesting. Gelcich et al. (2013) test for
differences between already established user groups in the Chilean loco fishery. They
show that members of fishing unions exhibit more pro-social tendencies and play the
game differently than members of weak unions and nonmembers. Such findings from
experimental research have profound implications for theories about collective action and
the environment; however, most studies are based on hypothetical scenarios, even when
conducted in the field (for example, see Cardenas & Ostrom, 2004 and Gelcich et al.,
2013). Based on their findings that experimental games do not robustly correlate with
empirical observations, Gurven and Winking (2008) argue that the use of games as a
methodological approach should complement, but not replace, ethnographic research.
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Drawing on ethnographic and fishery data from the field, my approach
complements experimental research that systematically studies the effects of ecological
dynamics on behavior (Janssen, 2010). Following Ruttan’s (2008) distinction between
two ways of measuring the success of collective action, I hypothesized that collective
action would have positive effects on common pool resources. As argued by Ruttan, the
success of collective action may be measured by 1) collective action problem, or the
degree to which individuals obey the rules-in-use or participate in the process or design
of management regimes; or 2) collective goods provisioning, which measures the
abundance, quality, or general condition of the resource base or institutions for
sustainable governance. In this paper, I focus on the first distinction since I have
addressed the effects of property arrangements on the cockle fishery elsewhere (Beitl,
2011).
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
(a) Research design, hypotheses, and procedure
The research design entails a mixed-methods approach using qualitative and
quantitative data to study behavior toward two common pool resource systems,
mangroves and the cockle fishery. Combining fishery data with ethnographic information
about a population of cockle fishers across four study areas in coastal Ecuador, I explore
how resource characteristics and the institutional context affect people’s behavior toward
common pool resources. Based on the literature and exploratory field research, I
developed the following hypotheses:
H1: Contributions to collective action are explained by membership in local
associations. I operationalize contributions to collective action as activities which may
promote mangrove conservation and restoration. This hypothesis draws upon the data
generated from informant responses on the questionnaire as to whether he/she had ever
participated in mangrove reforestation projects, political demonstrations in defense of
mangroves, workshops about mangroves or the cockle fishery, community development
projects like those designed by government and non-government agencies for cockle
mariculture, or a minga, which is a community work party organized in many rural areas
throughout Latin America.
H2: Members of associations are more likely than independent cockle collectors
to perceive problems of overexploitation in the fishery. Given that socios are organized
into groups, bound together under institutional affiliations, and connected to government
agencies, I expect they have more access to information about the status of the fishery
and therefore heightened levels of concern, which in turn, may influence their fishing
behavior.
H3: Membership in an association accounts for variation in average shell size in a
fisher’s catch, reflecting more awareness and heightened levels of concern (see H2).
Controlling for age, the number of small shells harvested as “seed” for mariculture, and
environmental variables such as community size (a proxy for fishing effort) and lunar
cycle, I predict that members of associations engage in conservation-oriented behaviors
like respecting the shell size regulations. My preliminary research on the fishery
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suggested a need to test these assumptions often made by government officials and socios
about who engages in more “responsible” fishing practices.
To test the hypotheses, I developed measures of sustainable fishing behavior and
collective action that were appropriate to the ethnographic context of the mangrove
cockle fishery in Ecuador. During the first phase of research involving observations in
several communities and major ports for cockle landings, I designed and pre-tested a
semi-structured questionnaire for cockle fishers. Many questions were based on
theoretical constructs and my observations during the exploratory phases (Johnson,
1998). Some questions were adapted from surveys created by the Instituto Nacional de
Pesca (INP), Ecuador’s national fishery research institute. The final questionnaire was
divided into the following sections: 1) information about cockles, including catch-perunit-effort (CPUE), shell length (mm), and sites of extraction; 2) baseline demographic
information; 3) questions about change in mangroves and the fishery; 4) household
livelihood strategies and participation in collective action. Basic demographic
information included whether the informant was a socio and the name of the association
to which he/she belonged. I coded responses to open-ended and semi-structured questions
from the interviews to create measures of collective action. To qualitatively explore
collective action as an outcome of local resistance to shrimp aquaculture, I created a
supplemental set of questions for representatives from associations about their
motivations for organizing and challenges they faced as a group.
To operationalize human-resource interactions in the fishery, I created proxies for
fishing behavior by calculating the mean shell length per individual catch, the proportion
of a catch with shells below the legal size, and CPUE. Shell length is often used in
fisheries science as a biological indicator of performance to determine the status of the
fishery (Flores & Mora, 2011). For the purposes of this study, shell length averages per
catch is an appropriate measure of “responsible fishing” since smaller shells indicate
noncompliance with customary norms and regulations concerning the harvest. Shell
length is a more appropriate measure of “responsible fishing” than CPUE, which may
more accurately indicate foraging efficiency, rather than intentional conservation.
These measures of collective action and human-resource interactions were
designed to function in multiple contexts, across study areas, and under a variety of
institutional arrangements to capture the complex interactions between institutions,
individuals, and the environment. My attention to the ethnographic context under which
civil society organizations began to flourish on the coast helps further explain the
efficacy of collective action in environmental governance.
(b) Description of population and study areas
This paper draws on multi-sited ethnographic research from January 2009 to
December 2010 in the provinces of Esmeraldas and El Oro on the Ecuadorian coast
(Figure 1). After exploratory research in 13 communities and major ports, I selected four
study areas to represent one urban area and one village in each of the two provinces: 1)
Muisne (pop. ~7,000); 2) Las Manchas (pop. ~50); 3) Puerto Hualtaco (pop. ~40,000);
and 4) Isla Costa Rica (pop. ~300). All study areas have been important centers for the
marketing of mangrove cockles, but have lost more than 50% of their original mangrove
cover since the 1980s.
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(Figure 1 here)
There are an estimated 5,000 cockle fishers dispersed throughout the five coastal
provinces in Ecuador (MacKenzie, 2001). Cockle collecting has traditionally been an
important household livelihood strategy, particularly in the provinces of Esmeraldas and
El Oro where the majority of cockle fishers are located (INP, 1971). Today, cockle
collecting is largely commercialized. Many collectors sell most of their catch to supply
local and regional markets, keeping only a handful of small shells for personal
consumption. Shells are typically gathered from the roots of mangrove trees during low
tide periods and each fishing trip lasts about three hours. Spring tides (associated with
full moon periods) have a longer lag time between high tide and low tide permitting
fishers to work longer hours if they wish. Some fishers take advantage of the longer
hours, particularly in Muisne, but most stay within the three-hour harvesting period.
Spring tides also allow fishers to travel further out or deeper into the mangroves to reach
areas that are normally submerged during neap tide periods.
In Puerto Hualtaco, eight to nine motorboats carry up to 30 fishers (Monday
through Saturday) to various sites along particular routes in the estuaries throughout the
archipelago. With the exception of Hualtaco, most cockle collectors head out in small
groups of friends or kin in motor-powered canoes, paddle canoes, or on foot to sites of
their choice. Thus the average fishing effort, defined by INP as the total number of
fishers on a given day, is higher in the urban areas of Hualtaco and Muisne (~200 and
~75, respectively) than in the villages of Isla Costa Rica and Las Manchas (~23 and ~10,
respectively).
Membership in associations is considerably higher in the province of El Oro
compared to Esmeraldas. In Esmeraldas, only 5% of those interviewed claimed affiliation
(n=59) and in El Oro, 60% belonged to a local association or cooperative (n=93). In
Esmeraldas, local associations of “ancestral users” focus their activities on mangrove
conservation and defense. In El Oro, fishing associations collaborate with government
agencies and focus on the development of the artisanal fishery sector. To date, there are
no custodias in either of the two study areas in Esmeraldas. These new common property
rights are the source of increasing tension among cockle collectors in El Oro (Beitl,
2012). Such differences between the two provinces provide important comparative
insights about the socio-political context for human-resource interactions.
(c) Participant recruitment and data collection
I administered the general questionnaire to cockle collectors orally after obtaining
informed consent and permission to count and measure the length of all shells in their
catch using a digital Vernier caliper (n=153). In the village of Isla Costa Rica, I recruited
participants (n=58) often with the help of the president of the association and his wife
after conducting a community census. In Puerto Hualtaco, local intermediaries, field
assistants, and occasionally INP biologists helped me randomly select individuals as they
disembarked from the boats returning from fishing trips as the tide was rising (n=33).ii In
Muisne, my field guide, Adrian and I randomly recruited informants from a boat situated
in the middle of the estuary at the end of the low tide period, offering refreshments and to
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tow people’s canoes into port in exchange for their participation (n=47). On several
occasions, we shuttled 10-15 cockle collectors to various sites, similar to the organization
of labor in Puerto Hualtaco, but on a smaller scale. In the village of Las Manchas, Adrian
and I recruited informants during five different visits (n=8), one of which we were invited
to participate in cockle collecting with a local family.
In the interviews, I enquired about perceptions of change in catch and shell size
over the last 10 years, the reasons why they believed the fishery was changing, whether
they were concerned about overexploitation, and whether they trusted that others obey
size regulations. I further enquired about their participation in reforestation and other
forms of collective action. The semi-structured questions always invited elaboration
depending on time, perceived patience, willingness, and age of the participants.
Immediately before or after the interview, I measured the length of all the shells in each
individual’s catch, resulting in a sample of 12,433 cockles gathered from 71 cockle beds
across the four study areas. I recorded the information with the help of one or more field
assistants or a digital voice recorder. For each fisher’s catch, I calculated the mean shell
length and proportion of shells below three size classes (45mm, 40mm, and 36mm).
In each site, I conducted one or more focus groups to present preliminary results,
verify the findings, and generate further discussion. Additionally, I gained much
understanding about the ethnographic context through my extended home-stay in Isla
Costa Rica, interviews and informal conversations with a variety of actors, and
participant observation on fishing trips, events, and community meetings in all study
areas.
(d) Variables and data analysis
Membership in an association (ASODUMMY) refers to present members, not
including children of socios or former socios. My dependent variable, collective action, is
represented by several proxy measures. I coded fixed responses from the interviews about
collective action. The measures of collective action as a contribution are represented by
five dichotomous dummy variables addressing the question of whether the informant had
ever participated in reforestation, community mariculture projects, workshops, mingas, or
political activism. I also coded free responses of informants when they offered to
elaborate, resulting in a different n for certain questions since missing variables were
dropped from the analysis (see Table 1).
Using SPSS 17.0 statistical software, I employed a 2-way cross-tabulation
appropriate for analyzing the relationship between two categorical variables. I used chisquare likelihood ratio tests to explore whether there were statistically significant
differences between socios and independents in their perceptions about mangroves, the
state of the fishery, and their participation in different kinds of collective action. For
continuous variables such as mean shell size, proportion of shells below legal size,
number of shells gathered per hour, and age of the fisher, I used ANOVA.
To explore other factors that account for variation in the mean shell length of each
catch, I conducted an OLS linear regression analysis using the average shell length within
each fisher’s catch (MEANTUB) as the dependent variable and proxy for fishing
behavior.iii The regression model is an appropriate estimator since the dependent variable
is normally distributed. Controlling for age of the collector, community size, lunar cycle,
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and province, I used OLS linear regression to determine how institutional and
environmental factors account for variation in fishing behavior. The two independent
variables of theoretical interest include membership (ASODUMMY) and whether the
informant trusts others comply with regulations (TRUST). Other independent and control
variables are described below.
Given the likelihood that the lunar cycle would influence characteristics of the
catch, I recorded the date of capture and coded each observation as spring tide or neap
tide (TIDEDUM) based on the tide table published by Instituto Oceanográfico de la
Armada (INOCAR, n.d.). Spring tides are characterized by extreme high and low water
levels, as well as longer lag times between high tide and low tide periods. In contrast,
neap tides under the new moon are shorter. Since Ecuador experiences a semi-diurnal
tide, the two low tide periods occasionally fall within daylight hours during the new
moon and some fishers seize the opportunity to work during both low tide periods.
Community size (COMSIZE) can be considered a social or environmental
variable. In the collective action literature, coordination is more difficult in large groups
(Olson, 1965). However, some researchers have highlighted the mixed effects of group
size on collective action (Yang et al., 2013). In the research presented here, group size is
a less useful construct since this population of fishers is not necessarily bound together by
a group. Thus the variable COMSIZE is more appropriately a proxy for fishing effort.
According to INP, the average daily fishing effort in Hualtaco is 192 and in Muisne, it is
55-80 individuals per day. Because of the relatively high fishing effort and classification
as “urban” (see Figure 1), these two study areas were coded 1 for large community. In
contrast, Isla Costa Rica with a daily fishing effort of 15-30, and Las Manchas with 1020, were each coded with a 0 for small community. I also included province to control for
unobserved geographic differences between study areas (PROVINCE).
In the two small communities, certain households practice mariculture, holding
live cockles in net enclosures in the estuary near their houses until they reach a larger size
or seasonal demand raises the market price. Collectors from those households often
harvest a number of shells smaller than 45mm as seed for their holding pens. Given the
likelihood that this practice affects the average shell size of each person’s catch, I
included the number of shells that were collected for mariculture (NUMCORRAL).
Finally, to further test the effects of ecological constraints on harvesting behavior,
several cockle fishers allowed me to measure their shells gathered from two or more sites
on different occasions (n=20). I used ANOVA to determine whether differences in shell
sizes gathered by the same individual on separate fishing trips were significant.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Mangroves and contributions to collective action
Membership in local associations fosters a higher propensity of individuals to
contribute to different kinds of collective action (Table 1). Socios participate more than
independents in mangrove reforestation, community mariculture, workshops, mingas, and
political activism related to the defense of mangroves. It is no surprise that the
differences are statistically significant since many of these kinds of activities are
organized by civil society institutions for their members, often in collaboration with other
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sectors (government, NGOs, or private shrimp farmers). Civil society institutions serve as
a social network that facilitates the flow of information, which may ultimately allow for
successful community-based management (Crona & Bodin, 2006).
(Table 1 here)
There are some incentives for individuals to contribute to collective action. As
mentioned earlier, many sponsors of reforestation projects offer a modest remuneration
equivalent to expected earnings from a fishing trip. In this way, mangrove planting has
evolved from a form of “symbolic resistance” during the early 1990s (Veuthey & Gerber,
2011) to new forms of multi-level institutional collaboration (Berkes, 2002). However,
even when there are no incentives like payment for participation, sometimes participation
is voluntary. Those who participate explain they are doing it for the greater good, for the
benefit of mangrove conservation, or because of their obligation as a socio. Some are
incentivized by the desire to maintain a good reputation as collaborative and dependable
among their peers. In the interviews, many socios expressed great pride in their ability to
collaborate with one another, government officials, or researchers like myself. Thus,
there are often social pressures among socios to participate, particularly in the smaller
communities where mingas, community organizations, and other collective activities are
part of daily life and an obligation for everyone. These findings corroborate experimental
research on collective action that emphasizes the importance of trust, reciprocity, and
reputation (Ostrom and Walker, 2003).
With financial support from international donors, activist organizations in Muisne
and Quito have been organizing public awareness events and demonstrations against
policies that have favored the shrimp industry since the early 1990s. While not all cockle
collectors recognize any benefits to participating in political demonstrations, many
expressed their feeling of empowerment now that they are able to make their voices
heard. Demonstrations are sometimes organized locally, but many often take place in the
capital city. For many cockle collectors who subsist on $5-20 a day, it is difficult to travel
and show support for these efforts. However, the NGOs organizing the events invite
members of associations throughout the coast to participate by covering their travel costs
and food expenses. Similarly, the local NGO in Muisne often supplies meals and pays for
the travel costs for socios from distant villages to participate in workshops. In contrast,
government agencies typically do not offer any compensation for participation. As such,
many associations in the province of El Oro and just a few in Esmeraldas raise their own
funds to send one or two representatives to events or workshops organized by
government agencies.
Independent cockle collectors give multiple reasons for not participating. Many of
the independents I interviewed said they did not know about events or were not “invited.”
In some interviews, I sensed some resentment in comments like, “they (the sponsors)
already have their people picked out” in reference to who is invited to participate; and
“only sabidos work in reforestation,” implying that members of associations are
conniving and corrupt. Some independent cockle collectors were interested in
participation, but did not have the money to pay membership dues to the local
association, reflecting the ways in which economic constraints can present barriers to
collective action (Beard, 2007). As one informant expressed, “They do not tell us (about
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reforestation projects) because we are the poorest of the poor, but yes, I would go…”
Others were interested, but were highly distrustful of local institutions, asserting they
hoard money for themselves and “always ask for collaboration but never give anything
back.” Overall, many independent cockle collectors in both provinces do not have the
time, resources, information, trust, or interest in contributing to these kinds of collective
action.
General suspicions among many independent cockle collectors about institutions
were more prevalent in Esmeraldas where several informants expressed their overall
disappointment in the ability of the local NGO to effect change. After confirming that I
was not affiliated with the NGO in the interviews, several informants confided their
belief that the NGO was “profiting from the poor.” I often heard the argument that they
“used” local people to advance their own interests, receiving large sums of international
donations while many cockle collectors remained destitute in the face of a declining
resource. Another critique was that they created certain levels of dependency among the
local associations who would not voluntarily participate without incentives. These
findings lend further support to the notion that trust is a crucial factor behind successful
collective action (Cook & Cooper, 2003; Eckel & Wilson, 2003; Jones, 2004). They
further represent the ways in which grassroots movements may sometimes become
further disconnected from local needs as they are increasingly scaled up and integrated
into global networks (Igoe, 2003).
(b) Environmental motivations mobilizing collective action
While civil society organizations serve as a context for collective action, they
simultaneously represent an outcome of collective action from a historical perspective.
Civil society began to flourish on the Ecuadorian coast throughout the 1990s and early
2000s when many people in coastal communities organized around social justice issues in
response to environmental degradation associated with shrimp farming. Some informants
in Muisne, Esmeraldas commented that they had participated in reforestation and
activism in the past when shrimp farms first began to encroach and there was a stronger
sense of trust in community organizers. They nostalgically recounted stories of
subversion when artisanal fishers and activists joined forces in the late 1980s to resist the
powerful shrimp industry, break pond walls and dykes, and threaten shrimp farmers with
machetes. However, as people increasingly lost confidence in the NGO and its affiliated
associations, the spirit of community activism also disintegrated. Among many
independent cockle collectors in Muisne today is a sense of hopelessness and resentment
against the very same activists who fervently advocated their cause many years ago.
Today Muisne, divided between hope and indifference, is a difficult place for the local
NGO to encourage participation. On the other hand, even one of its biggest critics in
Muisne mused, “Without collective action, if we hadn’t formed a group to resist shrimp
farming, we would have no mangroves today,” recognizing the NGO’s vital role in the
struggle over resource distribution conflicts.
In El Oro, many fishing associations similarly started out with the goal of
defending their livelihoods. Today, these institutionalized forms of collective action play
an important role in village life. As one community leader in Isla Costa Rica explained in
his own words, “Collective action is the backbone of small communities with little
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material wealth.” Other associations in Puerto Hualtaco organized for similar reasons in
the face of rapid mangrove deforestation that threatened so many livelihoods. Now
artisanal fishers in El Oro enjoy the benefits of government support in the form of credits,
subsidies, and for some associations, custodias. As such, the sense of hopelessness and
rampant individualism I observed in Muisne, Esmeraldas is much less pronounced in the
province of El Oro where fishers generally enjoy a higher standard of living, better prices
for their catch, and the benefits of government support. This point further draws attention
to the crucial role of the social-political context, which helps further explain the efficacy
of collective action.
Mangroves throughout the Ecuadorian coast are now on a path to recovery
through reforestation projects, custodias, awareness campaigns, and other
institutionalized forms of collective action. However, such motivations for mobilizing
raise important questions about whether the intentions of collective action are for
economic gain or restraint in the interests of conservation (Lu, 2001; Ruttan, 1998). This
may have less to do with the nature of the group and whether they are unified under a
collective identity (Mosimane et al., 2012), share a common understanding of risk
perception (Burke, 2001; Becker, 2003) or conservation ethic (Acheson & Gardner,
2010) and more to do with the characteristics of the resource system (Agrawal, 2001) and
the type of collective action problem at hand (Schlager, 1994).
(c) Fishing and the subtractability problem
The subtractability problem that characterizes the fishery is more difficult to
overcome. Many socios are critical of independent cockle collectors, contending they
lack awareness and understanding about the urgency of coastal resource decline. They
believe independent fishers are free riding off the hard work and collective efforts of
socios who sacrifice their time and energy for the greater good of resource conservation.
Since they are the ones that attend workshops and take time to become informed about
resource issues, many socios believe that independent cockle collectors lack awareness
and do not respect the size regulations or customary rules in fishing. However, several
proxies for “responsible fishing,” such as the mean shell length of each fisher’s catch and
the proportion of shells below the legal size of 45mm, show indistinguishable behavior
between socios and independents (Table 1). While on average, socios gather more shells
per hour of harvest, this does not necessarily reflect a conservation ethic. On the contrary,
it could be a function of access to better gathering grounds like custodias that restrict
public access or areas with a lower fishing effort like smaller communities.
Table 1 also shows that both socios and independents have a shared awareness of
risk perception (Burke, 2001) and perhaps some degree of a conservation ethic (Acheson
& Gardner, 2010). Both socios and independents acknowledge that the fishery has been
under pressure over the last 10 years (Table 1). However, socios are slightly more
concerned about the future and differ more strongly in their opinions about potential
solutions. This finding may reflect the ways in which information is disseminated and
shared among members of a social network (Crona & Bodin, 2006), or in this case, the
ways in which collective understanding is formed in a group bound together by
institutional membership.
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(Table 2 here)
(Table 3 here)
Despite slight differences in opinion about the urgency of fishery decline, the
regression results show there are no significant differences in fishing behavior between
socios and independents even after controlling for unobserved geographical differences
between provinces, lunar cycle periods, community size, and the number of cockles taken
as seed for mariculture (Table 3). Trust that others respect the rules also makes no
difference in harvesting behavior, although this could be due to the fact that most cockle
collectors are distrustful of other collectors in general. For both socios and independents,
fewer than 30% of cockle collectors trust that people cooperate in the commons.
However, for many socios, trust is conditional—that only other socios can be trusted.
Despite perceptions about how others interact with common pool resources, more
than half of the cockle collectors I interviewed claim they personally abide by the rulesin-use by leaving smaller shells (>45mm) in the mangrove for the benefit of resource
regeneration. However, there is also an indirect economic incentive for leaving small
shells. Even though merchants pay by the number rather than by the size of shells or
weight of the catch, the price is often negotiated based on subjective perceptions of
“quality,” or an eyeballed estimate of shell sizes and the proportion of a catch made up of
A. tuberculosa, the species considered more palatable by many consumers.
On the other hand, several informants, both socios and independents alike,
justified the collection of a handful of small shells for personal consumption to
completar, or reach a certain goal. Traditionally before fishery regulations were
implemented in 2001, keeping a handful of rechazos (non-marketable cockles) has long
been considered acceptable under customary norms. However today, both socios and
independents are worried that competition among fishers has resulted in the problem that
smaller shells are beginning to appear on the market. As one collector in Hualtaco
commented, “nobody gives the gathering grounds a rest anymore because if they do,
someone will come along tomorrow.” Another man from Muisne expressed similar
frustration, “the problem is that if I don’t take the small shells, someone else will come
along and do it, so it’s better that I take everything for myself.” In the two small
communities Isla Costa Rica and Las Manchas, cockle fishers justified the collection of
smaller shells as “seed” for mariculture. Thus, there is little incentive to follow the rulesin-use based on the anticipated behavior of others in the commons, despite one’s
perception of risk (Burke, 2001; Becker, 2003), conservation ethic (Acheson & Gardner,
2010), or communication through a social network (Crona & Bodin, 2006). Contrary to
other research on collective action (Araral, 2009; Folke & Berkes, 1995; Waring, 2011),
these results suggest that institutions have very little mediating effect on this kind of
collective action problem. As Schlager (1994) interestingly noted, the “appropriation
externalities” or the subtractability problem that characterizes many fisheries, is quite
different than other kinds of collective action problems.
(d) Subtractability and environmental constraints

17

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

The results of the regression analysis further suggest that environmental variables
are more important than characteristics of the fishers or the institutions that
hypothetically mediate their behavior. Shells harvested in the two large communities with
a higher fishing effort tend to be 1.78mm smaller. This finding is not surprising since a
higher fishing effort is often associated with harvesting pressures (Flores & Mora, 2011).
The lunar cycle also has a significant effect on shell size. Cockles harvested during spring
tides are 1.35mm larger, which is not surprising since spring tides allow people to work
longer hours, travel further out, or reach areas normally submerged during neap tides.
However most cockle collectors work three hours regardless of the lunar period, at least
in Puerto Hualtaco where the nine boats operate on regular three-hour schedules.
(Figure 2 here)
Figure 2 corroborates the results from the regression analysis, suggesting that
people harvest whatever the environment provides despite their conservation ethic or
membership in an association. The ANOVA tests show significant differences in the
average shell length and large-to-small shell proportions per catch, depending on the site
of extraction for 15 out of 20 individuals who allowed me to measure their shells on more
than one occasion. Within these environmental constraints, each collector gathers what
the environment provides, regardless of whether he/she is a socio or not. Thus, behavior
is situational, highly dependent on the environmental context, and most likely responding
to ecological dynamics (Janssen, 2010), which are not fully captured here.
Furthermore, both socios and independents express interest in respecting the shell
size regulations of 45mm, but many feel they have no choice but to completar in order to
make ends meet and support their families. Such decisions to break the rules reflect
rational choice perspectives that conservation is too costly (Acheson, 2011b). Contrary to
findings by Boyd and Richerson (1992), the threat of confiscation by authorities is not
enough to deter noncompliance. On the contrary, intermediaries awaiting the cockle
collectors in the port frequently use their cell phones to warn fishers returning from the
mangroves when the authorities are present. These increased levels of communication in
the presence of authorities illustrate the ways in which communication and cooperation
may sometimes operate against the interests of conservation (see Ruttan 1998). On the
other hand, noncompliance with the rules concerning size regulations in the fishery
commons often goes unnoticed. Few are able to observe such forms of non-cooperation
in the commons. Those who witness rule-breaking understand the challenges of
harvesting cockles under ecological constraints and would not likely turn their friends or
kin over to the authorities.
Finally, membership in an association may increase one’s access to communitymanaged gathering grounds with larger catch and shell sizes (Beitl, 2011), which lends
further justification for the creation of more custodias as common property regimes that
locally regulate access. Significantly more socios than independents believe that
custodias are a viable solution to overexploitation (37% compared to 5% respectively),
but there is still a lot of disagreement about the fairness concerning the enclosure of a
public good (Beitl, 2012).
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5. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to address gaps in the literature concerning the ways
in which resource characteristics and institutional context influence people’s behavior
toward common pool resources. The main contribution of this paper is the use of both
ethnographic and fishery data to explore human-resource interactions within two different
resource systems, highlighting the differential nature of collective action problems. My
findings suggest that both kinds of collective action problems (contribution and
subtractability) are similar for the common theme of sociality and such social relations
are reinforced by a group identity, such as institutional membership. Trust is a unifying
factor behind both kinds of collective action problems (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). Just as
a lack of trust discourages compliance with rules in the commons, a lack of trust in
institutions discourages participation. This research has also shown other aspects of
sociality that promote collective action (i.e. communication, social obligation, collective
perceptions of risk, commitment to collective goals, and the enforcement of sanctions)
operate differently depending on the resource system or level of analysis. This finding
suggests that attention to resource characteristics merits further study to advance theories
about collective action and governance of the commons (Janssen, 2010; Agrawal &
Benson, 2011; Basurto, 2008; Wutich, 2009).
The ambiguous effects of collective action concerning mangroves and their
associated artisanal fisheries are best explained in light of the different characteristics of
the resource systems, their distinct social histories and local explanations for decline, and
the differential nature of collective action problems. Both mangroves and their fisheries
in Ecuador represent two kinds of common pool resources, but the historical reasons for
their depletion are distinct. Fisheries are a classic commons problem characterized by
subtractability and excludability, in which rational extraction by one user is costly for the
group and the exclusion of users is difficult (Feeny, Hanna, McEnvoy, 1996; Ostrom et
al., 1999). As a different kind of common pool resource system, the sustainability of
mangrove forests in Ecuador has been undermined for different reasons. Largely
undervalued for the prospect of export-led growth promised by shrimp aquaculture, about
one-fourth of Ecuador’s mangroves have been converted into shrimp farms since the
1980s (Bailey, 1988; CLIRSEN-PMRC, 2007; Martinez-Alier, 2001). As a consequence,
fishers are generally united in their belief that shrimp farmers have been responsible for
the destruction of mangroves, but more divided in their perceptions about who is
responsible for the decline of fisheries. A sense of social solidarity and collective
responsibility has had less time to develop in the case of the cockle fishery, which has
only begun to experience pressure in the last 10 years. Given these different social
histories of each resource system, the coordination of individual actions is faced with a
different set of challenges concerning agreement over the underlying causes of resource
degradation.
The second explanation for mixed effects of collective action is related to the
nature of the collective action problem (Hardin, 1982; Schlager, 1994). Membership in
institutions encourages participation in activities that uphold the goals of mangrove
conservation, as well as the management of common property regimes like custodias.
Members of associations contribute to collective action for multiple reasons: 1) for their
obligations as socios; 2) to uphold their reputations as collaborative, dependable, and
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trustworthy; 3) for their fear of sanction for not following rules or group agreements; 4)
for their access to information about events and encouragement by their peers to
“collaborate” or participate; and 5) for their pride as members of associations and
ancestral users of mangroves. However, the subtractability problem that characterizes the
fishery is more difficult to overcome. Collective concern that the fishery is under pressure
is not necessarily unique to socios, but such perceptions have not yet translated into
practice in the broader population at the individual level. This research suggests that
harvesting behavior is highly situational and dependent on ecological constraints. Both
socios and independents alike are concerned about declining shell sizes, but feel they
have no choice but to harvest whatever the environment provides, regardless of their
membership in any institution or conservation ethic. This economic reality is not readily
captured in experimental research (Janssen, 2010; Ostrom & Walker, 2003; Gelcich et
al., 2013; Ledyard, 1995) where common pool resource dilemmas are hypothetical and
material economic returns are not at stake. While experimental research yields powerful
conclusions about decision making in the commons, it should not replace ethnographic
field studies of human-resource interactions; rather the two methodological approaches
have great potential to build theories about collective action in a complementary fashion
(Gurven & Winking, 2008).
One way to address the subtractability problem or “appropriation externality”
(Schlager, 1994) would be to increase the devolution of property rights to local
associations through the creation of more custodias that restrict access and operate
around periods of closure. However, improved resource conditions associated with
custodias may be more a function of ecological conditions produced by management
practices, rather than a reflection of “responsible fishing” by individuals, as this paper has
argued. Moreover, enclosing the commons for the benefit of particular groups raises
concerns about fairness, especially since there are often tradeoffs among outcomes of
ecological sustainability, livelihoods, and equity (Beitl, 2011; 2012; Agrawal and
Benson, 2011). Furthermore, while institutions encourage participation in mangrove
restoration, it remains unclear how these human dimensions contribute to socialecological change and how the benefits of mangrove restoration are distributed. Better
understanding of ecological processes is needed to determine the relationship between
mangrove recovery and fishery productivity. If institutions are promoting more
participation among artisanal fishers in the process of mangrove recovery, then how are
the benefits distributed back to fishers? What other socio-economic dynamics affect
fishing effort and individual adaptations to changing environmental conditions? A
systematic study of the fishing effort is needed to explore livelihoods and other
conditions under which individuals leave the fishery and alleviate pressure on resources
over time. Such further investigation comparing individual and collective adaptations to
environmental change would contribute to better understanding of human-resource
interactions at multiple levels and scales for building adaptive capacity and resilience
(Adger, 2003; Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004; Berkes, et al., 2003; Endter-Wada &
Keenan, 2005; Nelson, et al. 2007).
A common policy prescription in the commons literature has emphasized a need
to create institutions for collective action for the sustainable governance of resources
(Gibson & Becker, 2000; Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom, 1990; RuizBallesteros & Gual, 2012; Smith & Berkes, 1991). My findings suggest another reason to
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move beyond panaceas and prescriptions for common pool resource management
(Basurto & Ostrom, 2009). While civil society plays an increasing role in environmental
conservation and local empowerment (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002; Little, 1999), not all
citizens have the interest, resources, or trust motivating them to participate. Implications
for resources under such conditions of heterogeneity and larger scales cannot be
understated. The commons are not always easily bound by institutions or communities.
Fostering trust and solidarity among the larger population cockle fishers in Ecuador who
all universally share a stake in the fate of the dynamic mangrove commons will continue
to challenge the strength and effectiveness of civil society as a context for collective
action.
REFERENCES
Acheson, J. (1987). The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecological Effects of
Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Fishery. In B. J. McCay & J. M. Acheson
(Eds.), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal
Resources (pp. 37-65). Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Acheson, J. (2011a). Ostrom for Anthropologists. International Journal of the Commons,
5(2), 319-339.
Acheson, J. (2011b). "Coming Up Empty: Management Failure of the New England
Ground Fishery." MAST 10(1): 57-86.
Acheson, J., & Gardner, R. (2010). The evolution of conservation rules and norms in the
Maine lobster industry. [Article]. Ocean and Coastal Management, 53, 524-534.
Adger, W. N. (2003). Social Capital, Collective Action and Adaptation to Climate
Change. Economic Geography, 79, 387-404.
Adger, W. N., Hughes, T. P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., & Rockstrom, J. (2005). SocialEcological Resilience to Coastal Disasters. Science, 309(5737), 1036-1039.
Agrawal, A. (2001). Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of
Resources. World Development, 29(10), 1649-1672.
Agrawal, A., & Gibson, C. C. (1999). Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of
Community in Natural Resource Conservation. World Development, 27(4), 629649.
Agrawal, A. (2002). Common Resources and Institutional Stability. In E. Ostrom, T.
Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, E. U. Weber & National Research
Council (U.S.). Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change. (Eds.),
The Drama of the Commons (pp. 41-85). Washington, DC: National Academy
Press.
Agrawal, A., & Benson, C. S. (2011). Common property theory and resource governance
institutions: strengthening explanations of multiple outcomes. Environmental
Conservation, 38(02), 199-210. doi: doi:10.1017/S0376892910000925
Alongi, D. M. (2002). Present State and Future of the World's Mangrove Forests.
Environmental Conservation 29(3), 331-349.
Anderies, J. M., Janssen, M. A., & Ostrom, E. (2004). A framework to analyze the
robustness of social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective. Ecology
and Society, 9(1), 18.

21

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

Antinori, C., & Bray, D. B. (2005). Community forest enterprises as entrepreneurial
Firms: Economic and institutional perspectives from Mexico. World
Development, 33(9), 1529-1543.
Araral, E. J. (2009). What Explains Collective Action in the Commons? Theory and
Evidence from the Philippines. [doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.002]. World
Development, 37(3), 687-697.
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science,
211(4489), 1390-1396.
Bailey, C. (1988). The social consequences of tropical shrimp mariculture development.
[doi: DOI: 10.1016/0951-8312(88)90004-5]. Ocean and Shoreline Management,
11(1), 31-44.
Basurto, X. (2005). How Locally Designed Access and Use Controls Can Prevent the
Tragedy of the Commons in a Mexican Small-Scale Fishing Community. Society
& Natural Resources, 18(7), 643-659.
Basurto, X. (2008). Biological and Ecological Mechanisms Supporting Marine SelfGovernance: the Seri Callo de Hacha Fishery in Mexico Ecology and Society,
13(2), online:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss12/art20/main.html#ABSTRACT
accessed 16/19/10.
Basurto, X., & Ostrom, E. (2009). Beyond the Tragedy of the Commons. Economia delle
fonti di energia e dell’ambiente, 52(1), 35-60.
Beard, V. A. (2007). Household Contributions to Community Development in Indonesia.
World Development, 35(4), 607-625.
Becker, C. D. (1999). Protecting the Garua Forest in Ecuador: The Role of Institutions
and Ecosystem Valuation. Ambio, 28(2), 156-161.
Becker, C. D. (2003). Grassroots to Grassroots: Why Forest Preservation was Rapid at
Loma Alta, Ecuador. World Development, 31(1), 163-176.
Beitl, C.M. (2011). Cockles in Custody: The Role of Common Property Arrangements in
the Ecological Sustainability of Mangrove Fisheries on the Ecuadorian Coast.
International Journal of the Commons 5(2), 485-512. Online:
http://tinyurl.com/c482gv482ey.
Beitl, C.M. (2012). Shifting Policies, Access, and the Tragedy of Enclosures in
Ecuadorian Mangrove Fisheries: Towards a Political Ecology of the Commons.
Journal of Political Ecology, 19, 94-113. Online:
http://jpe.library.arizona.edu/Volume119/Volume_119.html.
Berkes, F. (2002). Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up.
In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, E. U. Weber &
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on the Human Dimensions of
Global Change. (Eds.), The drama of the commons (pp. 293-321). Washington,
DC: National Academy Press.
Berkes, F., Folke, C., & Colding, J. (1998). Linking Social and Ecological Systems:
Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for Building Resilience.
Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Berkes, F. (1996). Social Systems, Ecological Systems, and Property Rights. In S. Hanna,
C. Folke & K.-G. Mäler (Eds.), Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural,

22

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment (pp. 87-107).
Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Berkes, F. (2005). Commons Theory for Marine Resource Management in a Complex
World. Senri Ethnological Studies, 67, 13-31.
Berkes, F., Colding, J., & Folke, C. (2003). Navigating Social-Ecological Systems:
Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Biedenweg, K., & Monroe, M. (2013). Teasing Apart the Details: How Social Learning
can Affect Collective Action in the Bolivian Amazon. Human Ecology, 41(2),
239-253. doi: 10.1007/s10745-012-9535-y
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (1992). Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or
Anything Else) in Sizable Groups Ethology and Sociobiology, 13, 171-185.
Bravo, M. (2007). Analisis de la Base Legal Para el Otorgamiento de las Concesiones de
Manglar, Responsabilidades Jurídicas Respecto a Talas en Zonas
Concesionadadas, y Competencias para Expedir los Acuerdos de Uso Sustentable
y Custodia del Manglar. Guayaquil, Ecuador.
Bray, D., Ellis, E., Armijo-Canto, N., & Beck, C. T. (2004). The Institutional Drivers of
Sustainable Landscapes: A Case Study of the 'Maya Zone' in Quintana Roo,
Mexico. Land Use Policy, 21, 333-346.
Burke, B. (2001). Hardin Revisited: A Critical Look at Perception and the Logic of the
Commons. Human Ecology, 29(4), 449-476.
Cardenas, J.-C., & Ostrom, E. (2004). What do People Bring into the Game? Experiments
in the Field about Cooperation in the Commons. Agricultural Systems, 82(3), 307326.
CLIRSEN-PMRC. (2007). Actualización del Estudio Multitemporal de Manglares,
Camaroneras y Áreas Salinas en la Costa Continental Ecuatoriana al Año 2006.
Guayaquil, Ecuador: Centro de Levantamientos Integrados de Recursos Naturales
por Sensores Remotos & the Programa de Manejo de Recursos Costeros.
Coello, S., Vinueza Burgos, D., & Alemán, R. (2008). Evaluación del desempeño de los
acuerdos de uso sustentabale y custodia de manglar de la zona costera del
Ecuador. Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador – Conservación Internacional –
Unión Mundial para la Naturaleza (UICN) – Comisión Mundial de Áreas
Protegidas de UICN – Programa de apoyo a la gestión descentralizada de los
recursos naturales en las tres provincias del norte del Ecuador (PRODERENA) –
Ecobiotec. Guayaquil, Ecuador. pp. 1-52.
Cook, K. S., & Cooper, R. M. (2003). Experimental Studies of Cooperation, Trust and
Social Exchange. In E. Ostrom & J. Walker (Eds.), Trust and reciprocity:
Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research (pp. 209-244). New York,
NY US: Russell Sage Foundation.
Cormier-Salem, M. C. (2006). Mangrove: Changes and Conflicts in Claimed Ownership,
Uses and Purposes. In C. T. Hoanh, T. P. Tuong, J. W. Gowing & B. Hardy
(Eds.), Environment and Livelihoods in Tropical Coastal Zones: Managing
Agriculture-Fishery-Aquaculture Conflicts (pp. 163-176). Oxon, UK: CAB
International.

23

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

Crona, B., & Bodin, O. (2006). What You Know is Who You Know? Communication
Patterns Among Resource Users as a Prerequisite for Co-management. Ecology &
Society, 11(2), 290-312.
Cruz-Torres, M. L. (2000). "Pink Gold Rush:" Shrimp Aquaculture, Sustainable
Development, and the Environment in Northwestern Mexico. Journal of Political
Ecology, 7, 63-90.
Deb, A. K. (1998). Fake Blue Revolution: Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts
of Shrimp Culture in the Coastal Areas of Bangladesh. Ocean & Coastal
Management, 41(1), 63-88.
Dewalt, B. R., Vergne, P., & Hardin, M. (1996). Shrimp Aquaculture Development and
the Environment: People, Mangroves and Fisheries on the Gulf of Fonesca,
Honduras. World Development, 24(7), 1193-1208.
Dolsak, N., & Ostrom, E. (2003). The Challenges of the Commons. In N. Dolsak & E.
Ostrom (Eds.), The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation
(pp. 3-34). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2003). The Human Face and Game Theory: Trust and
Reciprocity in Sequential Games. In E. Ostrom & J. Walker (Eds.), Trust and
reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research (pp. 245-274).
New York, NY US: Russell Sage Foundation.
Endter-Wada, J., & Keenan, S. P. (2005). Adaptations by Long-Term Commercial
Fishing Families in the California Bight: Coping with Changing Coastal
Ecological and Social Systems. Human Organization, 64(3), 225-239.
FAO. (2007). The world's mangroves 1980-2005. Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations.
Feeny, D., Hanna, S., & McEvoy, A. F. (1996). Questioning Assumptions of the
`Tragedy of the Commons'. Land Economics, 72(2), 187.
Flores, L., & Mora, E. (2011). Evaluando Variaciones en la Talla de Anadara
tuberculosa y Anadara similis en el Archipiélago de Jambelí: Hay Indicios de
Sobrepesca? Revista de Ciencias del Mar y Limnología, 4(1).
Folke, C., & Berkes, F. (1995). Mechanisms that Link Property Rights to Ecological
Systems. In S. Hanna & M. Munasinghe (Eds.), Property Rights and the
Environment: Social and Ecological Issues (pp. 121-137). Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.: Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics and the World
Bank.
Gelcich, S., Guzman, R., Rodríguez-Sickert, C., Castilla, J. C., & Cárdenas, J. C. (2013).
Exploring External Validity of Common Pool Resource Experiments: Insights
from Artisanal Benthic Fisheries in Chile. Ecology and Society, 18(3). doi:
10.5751/ES-05598-180302
Gibson, C. C., & Becker, D. D. (2000). A Lack of Institutional Demand: Why a Strong
Local Community in Western Ecuador Fails to Protect Its Forest. In C. C. Gibson,
M. A. McKean & E. Ostrom (Eds.), People and Forests: communities, institutions
and governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gibson, C. C., McKean, M. A., & Ostrom, E. (2000). People and Forests: communities,
institutions and governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Guest, G. S. (1999). Global Vision and Local Lives: Policy, Participation, and Coastal
Management in Ecuador. Culture and Agriculture, 21(1), 1-13.

24

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

Gunawardena, M., & Rowan, J. S. (2005). Economic Valuation of a Mangrove
Ecosystem Threatened by Shrimp Aquaculture in Sri Lanka. [Article].
Environmental Management, 36(4), 535-550.
Gurven, M., & Winking, J. (2008). Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in
and out of the Laboratory. American Anthropologist, 110(2), 179-190.
Hardin, G. (1968). Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
Hardin, R. (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future
by the Johns Hopkins University Press.
Henrich, J., Boyd, C. E., Bowles, S., Camerer, C. F., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., . . . Tracer, D.
(2005). 'Economic Man' in Cross Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in
15 Small-Scale Societies. Behavior and Brain Science, 28, 795-855.
Homer-Dixon, T., & Blitt, J. (Eds.). (1998). Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment,
Population, and Security. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Igoe, J. (2003). Scaling up Civil Society: Donor Money, NGOs and the Pastoralist Land
Rights Movement in Tanzania. [Article]. Development & Change, 34(5), 863-885.
INOCAR. (n.d.). Calendario de Aguajes y Fase Lunar. Instituto Oceanográfico de la
Armada (INOCAR): http://www.inocar.mil.ec.
INP. (1971). Segundo Censo Pesquero Nacional. Guayaquil, Ecuador: Instituto Nacional
de Pesca, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Direccion General de Pesca.
Janssen, M. (2010). Introducing Ecological Dynamics into Common-Pool Resource
Experiments. Ecology and Society, 15(2), 7.
Johnson, C., & Forsyth, T. (2002). In the eyes of the state: Negotiating a "rights-based
approach" to forest conservation in Thailand. [Article]. World Development,
30(9), 1591-1605.
Johnson, J. (1998). Research Design and Research Strategies in Cultural Anthropology.
In H. R. Bernard (Ed.), The Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology (pp.
131-171): Altimira Press.
Jones, E. C. (2004). Wealth-Based Trust and the Development of Collective Action.
World Development, 32(4), 691-711.
Kurien, J. (1995). Collective Action for Common Property Resource Rejuvenation: The
Case of People's Artificial Reefs in Kerala State, India Human Organization,
54(2).
Kurzban, R. (2003). Biological Foundations of Reciprocity. In E. Ostrom & J. Walker
(Eds.), Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental
research (pp. 105-127). New York, NY US: Russell Sage Foundation.
Laughlin, C. D., Jr. (1974). Deprivation and Reciprocity. Man, 9(3), 380-396.
Ledyard, J. O. (Ed.). (1995). Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Little, P. E. (1999). Environments and Environmentalisms in Anthropological Research:
Facing a New Millennium. Annual Review of Anthropology, 28(1), 253-284.
Lu, F. E. (2001). The Common Property Pegime of the Huaorani Indians of Ecuador:
Implications and Challenges to Conservation. Human Ecology, 29(4), 425-447.
MacKenzie, C. (2001). The Fisheries for Mangrove Cockles, Anadara spp., from Mexico
to Peru, With Descriptions of Their Habitats and Biology, the Fishermen's Lives,
and the Effects of Shrimp Farming Marine Fisheries Review, 63(1), 1-39.

25

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

Martinez-Alier, J. (2001). Ecological Conflicts and Valuation: Mangroves versus
Shrimps in the Late 1990s. [Article]. Environment and Planning C-Government
and Policy, 19(5), 713-728.
McCay, B. J. (2002). Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts, Situations,
and Events. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S. Stonich, E. U.
Weber & National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on the Human
Dimensions of Global Change. (Eds.), The Drama of the Commons (pp. 361-402).
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
McCay, B. J., & Acheson, J. M. (1987). The Question of the Commons: The Culture and
Ecology of Communal Resources. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Meltzoff, S. K., & LiPuma, E. (1986). The Social Economy of Coastal Resources:
Shrimp Mariculture in Ecuador. Culture & Agriculture(28), 1-19.
Mora, E., & Moreno, J. (2009). La Pesqueria Artesanal del Recurso Concha (Andara
tuberculosa y A. similis) en la Costa Ecuatoriana durante el 2004. Boletín
Cientifico y Técnico, 20(1), 1-16.
Mora, E., Moreno, J., & Jurado, V. (2009). La Pesquería Artesanal del Recurso Concha
en las Zonas de Esmeraldas y El Oro, Durante el 2008. Boletín Cientifico y
Técnico, 20(2), 17-36.
Mora, E., Moreno, J., & Jurado, V. (2011). Un Análisis de la Pesquería del Recurso
Concha en Ecuador Durante el 2010 Boletin Científico Técnico, 21(2), 1-13.
Mosimane, A. W., Breen, C., & Nkhata, B., A. . (2012). Collective identity and resilience
in the management of common pool resources. [Journal article]. International
Journal of the Commons(2), 344.
Nelson, D. R., Adger, W. N., & Brown, K. (2007). Adaptation to Environmental Change:
Contributions of a Resilience Framework. Annual Review of Environment and
Resources, 32, 395-419.
Olsen, S. B., Ochoa, E., & Robadue, D. (2003). Ecuador: Establishing a Coastal
Management Program in an Unstable System. In S. B. Olsen (Ed.), Crafting
Coastal Governance in a Changing World (pp. 75-116). Coastal Resources
Center, University of Rhode Island: Coastal Management Report #2241.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups. Cambridge,: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective
Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. The
American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1-22.
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting
the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science, 284, 278-282.
Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolsak, N., Stern, P. C., Stonich, S., Weber, E. U., & National
Research Council (U.S.). Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global
Change. (2002). The Drama of the Commons. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, games, and common-pool resources.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

26

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

Ostrom, E., & Walker, J. (2003). Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from
Experimental Research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Persha, L., Agrawal, A., & Chhatre, A. (2011). Social and Ecological Synergy: Local
Rulemaking, Forest Livelihoods, and Biodiversity Conservation. Science,
331(6024), 1606-1608. doi: 10.1126/science.1199343
Persha, L., Fischer, H., Chhatre, A., Agrawal, A., & Benson, C. (2010). Biodiversity
Conservation and Livelihoods in Human-Dominated Landscapes: Forest
Commons in South Asia. Biological Conservation, 143(12), 2918-2925. doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2010.03.003
Pollnac, R., & Johnson, J. (2005). Folk Management and Conservation of Marine
Resources: Towards a Theoretical and Methodological Assessment. In N.
Kishigami, J. M. Savelle & K. M. Hakubutsukan. (Eds.), Indigenous Use and
Management of Marine Resources (pp. 33-50). Suita, Osaka: National Museum of
Ethnology.
Primavera, J. H. (1997). Socio-Economic Impacts of Shrimp Culture. Aquaculture
Research, 28(10), 815-827.
Ratner, B. D., Meinzen-Dick, R., & May, C. (2013). Resource conflict, collective action,
and resilience: an analytical framework. International Journal of the Commons,
7(1), 183-208.
Robadue, D. (Ed.). (1995). Eight Years in Ecuador: The Road to Integrated Coastal
Management (CRC technical report ; no. 2088) Narrangensett, RI: Coastal
Resources Center, University of Rhode Island.
Rosero Moya, K., & Santillan Salas, C. (2011). Ministerio del Ambiente Entrega
Acuerdo de Uso Sustentable y Custodia de Manglar. Boletin No. 498 09-06-2011,
http://www.ambiente.gob.ec/?q=node/1952 (accessed: 8/14/2011).
Ruiz-Ballesteros, E., & Gual, M. (2012). The Emergence of New Commons. [Article].
Human Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 40(6), 847-862.
Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2010). Conditional Cooperation and Costly
Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management. Science,
330(6006), 961-965.
Ruttan, L. (1998). Closing the Commons: Cooperation for Gain or Restraint? Human
Ecology, 26(1), 43-66.
Ruttan, L. M. (2006). Sociocultural Heterogeneity and the Commons. Current
Anthropology, 47(5), 843-853.
Ruttan, L. M. (2008). Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective
Action and Collective Goods Provisioning. [doi:
10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.05.005]. World Development, 36(5), 969-985.
Schlager, E. (1994). Fishers' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource
Dilemmas. In E. Ostrom, R. Gardner & J. Walker (Eds.), Rules, Games, and
Common-Pool Resources (pp. 247-265). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
Smith, A. H., & Berkes, F. (1991). Solutions to the "Tragedy of the Commons": Seaurchin management in St Lucia, West Indies. . Environmental Conservation,
18(2), 131-136.

27

Adding Environment to the Collective Action Problem

Beitl

Smith, E. A. (2010). Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of
human cooperation. [doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.03.001]. Evolution and
Human Behavior, 31(4), 231-245.
Stonich, S. (1995). The environmental quality and social justice implications of shrimp
mariculture development in Honduras. Human Ecology, 23(2), 143-168.
Stonich, S., & Vandergeest, P. (2001). Violence, Environment, and Industrial Shrimp
Farming. In N. L. Peluso & M. Watts (Eds.), Violent environments (pp. 261-286).
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Stonich, S. C., & Bailey, C. (2000). Resisting the Blue Revolution: Contending
Coalitions Surrounding Industrial Shrimp Farming. Human Organization, 59(1),
23-36.
Tilly, L., & Tilly, C. (1981). Class Conflict and Collective Action. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications.
Trivers, R. (1971). The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology,
46(1), 35-57.
Valiela, I., Bowen, J., & York, J. (2001). Mangrove Forests: One of the World's
Threatened Major Tropical Environments. BioScience, 51(10), 807-815.
Veuthey, S., & Gerber, J.-F. (2011). Accumulation by dispossession in coastal Ecuador:
Shrimp farming, local resistance and the gender structure of mobilizations.
[Article]. Global Environmental Change.
Waring, T. M. (2011). Ethnic Forces in Collective Action: Diversity, Dominance, and
Irrigation in Tamil Nadu. [Article]. Ecology & Society, 16(4), 1-19.
Wutich, A. (2009). Water Scarcity and the Sustainability of a Common Pool Resource
Institution in the Urban Andes. Human Ecology, 37(2), 179-192.
Yang, W., Liu, W., Viña, A., Tuanmu, M.-N., He, G., Dietz, T., & Liu, J. (2013).
Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(27), 10916-10921. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1301733110
NOTES
i

Executive Decree No. 1391 of the 15 of Octubre 2008, published in Registro Oficial 454 de 27 de octubre
de 2008. Under this executive decree, shrimp farmers had until March 31, 2010 to submit their application
to legalize their lease occupying historical mangrove areas under the condition that they relinquish a certain
percentage of their shrimp farm depending on the year of its construction and the total area occupying
former mangrove habitat. For example, if the shrimp pond illegally occupies 10 ha of mangroves or less,
the farmer would be responsible for reforesting 10%. For 11-50 ha of illegal occupation, he must reforest
20%. For 51-250 ha, he must reforest 30% within a year from submission of the application. Shrimp farms
occupying areas declared as protected areas by the Ministry of Environment must be vacated immediately
at the cost of the shrimp farmer, unless its construction took place before the area was formally declared
protected.
ii
Of the 36 recruited in Puerto Hualtaco, only three declined to participate.
iii
All statistical analyses were conducted only for A. tuberculosa since it is ecologically more abundant and
more culturally important.
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Table 1. Differences between members and independents in their contributions to collective action and
other characteristics
Independent
Collectors

Variables

Participation/ contribution to collective action
Participation in reforestation (%) *
Participation in community mariculture projects (%) *
Participation in workshops (%) *
Participation in a minga (%) *
Participation in a political march in defense of mangroves and
livelihoods or fisheries (%) *
Perception and opinion regarding state of mangroves and fisheries
Perceive difference catch sizes over the last 10 years (%)
Believe a difference in catch is explained by lack of awareness (%) *
Concerned about the future of the fishery (%) *
Claim to always leave small shells in the mangrove (%)
Trust that others leave small shells in the mangrove (%)
Not everyone has the right to work in mangroves: it is ok to exclude
some fishers (%)
Believe custodias are beneficial for the resource (%) *
Suggest custodias are a potential solution to overexploitation (%) *
Believe that people respect the boundaries of custodias (%)
Other descriptive statistics
Age *
Shells gathered per hour *
Shell length per catch (mm)
Proportion of shells in catch <45mm (%)
Proportion of shells in catch <40mm (%)
Proportion of shells in catch <36mm (%)

Association
Members

58
28
18
68

n
83
71
68
65

83
53
73
98

n
54
51
40
42

43

76

88

49

87
15
78
68
20

76
62
74
73
65

96
37
96
62
27

55
52
52
52
44

12
62
5
29

68
53
61
24

25
85
37
28

44
47
46
43

32.48
24.05
45.34
52
20
3

69
74
75
75
75
75

38.74
32.71
45.64
50
20
4

54
43
43
43
43
43

* Differences are significant at p < 0.05 level.
a
Chi-square likelihood ratios were performed on categorical variables and analysis of variance (ANOVA)
tests were performed on continuous variables to test for statistically significant differences between socios
and independents.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable

Description

N

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

118

45.45

2.591

38.14

52.11

118
118
118
118

0.36
31.85
0.59
0.27

0.483
14.075
0.493
0.446

0
8
0
0

1
70
1
1

118
115
98

0.58
2.08
0.13

0.495
8.280
0.341

0
0
0

1
72
1

Dependent Variable
MEANTUB

Mean shell length in each fisher's catch (mm)

Independent variables
ASODUMMY
Member of association
AGE
Age of fisher
COMSIZE
Size of community
TIDEDUM
Lunar cycle (spring tide)
PROVINCE
Fixed effects to control for unobserved geographical
heterogeneity
NUMCORRAL Number of cockles used for mariculture
TRUST
Trust that other users comply with rules-in-use
Valid
n=95

Note: Please refer to Section 3d for a more detailed description of the variables.

Table 3. OLS regression results for fishing behavior (MEANTUB)
Predictor

Coef.

SE Coef.

T

P

(Constant)
Member of association
Age of fisher
Size of community
Lunar cycle (spring tide)
Fixed effects to control for unobserved
geographical heterogeneity
Number of cockles used for mariculture
Trust that other users comply with rulesin-use

47.099
0.367
-0.008
-1.821
1.455

0.840
0.659
0.020
0.578
0.549

56.102
0.556
-0.415
-3.152
2.652

0.000
0.579
0.679
0.002*
0.010*

-1.261
-0.081

0.631
0.030

-1.999
-2.684

0.049*
0.009*

0.475

0.777

0.611

0.543

N = 94, R2 = 19.9%, R2 (adj) = 13.4%, p = 0.006.
* Significant at p < 0.05 level.
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Figure 2. Differences in mean shell length of an individual’s catch by fishing trip (n=20) in the provinces of (a) Esmeraldas
and (b) El Oro. S=socio, IND=independent.
* One or more indicators significant at p < 0.05 level.
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